Respecting Children's Choices

Moral Philosophy and Politics 7 (2):199-218 (2020)
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Abstract

The traditional liberal view on conflicts between care for wellbeing and respect for choice and desire is that we should look to degrees of competence and voluntariness to determine which moral imperative should take priority. This view has likely influenced the common view that children’s choices should be considered only to the extent that this promotes their future autonomy and helps us determine their best interests. I reject both the general traditional liberal view and its application to children. Competence and voluntariness, as well as maturity, are at best proxies for what really matters, which is wellbeing, choice and desire. We typically have reason to respect children’s choices, irrespective of any further positive consequences. If we should more often make children do what they do not want to do, this is mainly because, though we should care about respecting their choices, we should care even more about their wellbeing and future autonomy.

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Kalle Grill
Umeå University

References found in this work

Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
The moral limits of the criminal law.Joel Feinberg - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to self.Joel Feinberg - 1984 - New York,USA: Oxford University Press.
Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist.

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