The aim of this paper is to evaluate the possibility of noninten-tional phenomena in the contemporary phenomenology, based on the phenom-enological works of French thinker Jean-Luc Marion and the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl. It is shown that in determining nonintentional phenomena Marion operates with a very narrow understanding of intentionality, which he incorrectly ascribes to Husserl, and that nonintentional phenomena he is describing are in fact intentional in the broad sense of the word. It is argued that nonintentional phenomena in Marion’s phenomenology are equated with non-conceptual phenomena and are possible only based on a narrow understanding of intentionality understood as conceptualization, which is not substantiated. It is demonstrated that if intentionality is understood more broadly as the constitution of any temporal unity – conceptual and nonconceptual – Marion cannot justify the possibility of nonintentional phenomena. Despite Marion’s inability to account for the possibility of nonintentional phenomena at the end of the paper the possibility of nonintentional phenomena based on the broad understanding of intentionality is suggested.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 978-1-63435-038-9
DOI 10.5840/wcp23201827653
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