Phronesis 47 (4):336-358 (2002)

Authors
Filip Grgic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb
Abstract
This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not meant to provide an explanation of akrasia, as is usually supposed by commentators. Since the akratic knows that the action she is performing is not good for her, and actions are particulars, the akratic's knowledge is about a particular. I argue that Aristotle's discussion in EN 7.3 adds strength to the idea that knowledge of a particular is explainable only in terms of knowledge of a universal. More determinately, knowledge of a particular is explainable in terms of the actualization or use of knowledge of a universal, and such an actualization is in turn explainable by means of the syllogistic form. Thus, I argue that syllogisms in 7.3 (esp. at 1146 35-1147 10) are not "practical syllogisms", but that their function is epistemological: they are meant to reveal the structure and content of the akratic's knowledge, not to explain her actions
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DOI 10.1163/156852802321016532
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Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning.Byron J. Stoyles - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):195-207.
Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 43:25-50.
Incontinence and Perception.Greg Bassett - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1019-1028.
El problema de la akrasia en las Disertaciones de Epicteto.Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich - 2008 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 41:109-130.

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