The naturalness of religious imagination and the idea of revelation
Abstract
In this article the phenomenon of religious imagination is taken as a test case for discussing the relevance of cognitive science to philosophy of religion and theology. With Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh, it is argued that all human cognitive faculties are both propelled and constrained by metaphors originating from the movements of self-aware bodies in space; accordingly, religious concepts and images are to be treated on par with all other concepts and images. Pascal Boyer’s Religion Explained is then critically discussed. It is argued that Boyer’s claim of having ‘explained’ religious imagination as counterintuitive blendings of evolutionarily inherited templates is highly problematic. Evolutionary psychology has not yet given any evidence of an evolutionary hard-wiring of religious concepts, and Boyer’s reference to the mind-set of hunterers and gatherers does not catch the complexity of later developments in religious thought. For all, the internal systematization of religious imageries, and the possibility of a religious self-criticism in terms of philosophy is not reflected in Boyer’s theory. Religious imagination may indeed be natural; but its naturalness neither counts for nor against the truth-claims involved in religious images