The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge

Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The claim that knowledge is a kind of success from ability has great theoretical power: it explains the nature of epistemic normativity, why knowledge is incompatible with luck, and why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper addresses objections to the view by wedding it with two additional ideas: that intellectual abilities display a certain structure, and that the concept of knowledge functions to flag good information, and good sources of information, for use in practical reasoning.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic value and achievement.Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Ratio 25 (2):216-230.
Why the Ability Hypothesis is best forgotten.Sam Coleman - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.
Knowledge-how and ability.Franck Lihoreau - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):263-305.
Knowledge and success from ability.John Greco - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
357 (#53,489)

6 months
16 (#136,207)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Greco
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.

View all 108 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 16 references / Add more references