Abstract

The central concern of the dissertation is the debate in epistemology between foundationalism and coherentism. However, my working assumption is that progress in this debate can be made only after an extended investigation into epistemic justification and its relation to knowledge. ;My strategy is to defend a picture of knowledge in which two kinds of virtue are required. First, in order for p to be knowledge for S, S must be justified in believing p in the sense that S's believing p is epistemically responsible. The second way in which knowledge is virtuous is that it is belief tied to truth in a non-accidental manner. Thus knowledge requires that belief be arrived at through processes which are objectively reliable. ;The picture of knowledge which is defended, then, maintains a conception of epistemic justification which may be properly labeled internalist. However, it adds an externalist condition to knowledge which is typically absent from traditional analyses. This approach, it is argued, satisfies the best intuitions of the internalist while sufficiently addressing the original motivations for externalism. ;The dissertation divided into two parts. The first part is a defense of the accounts of justification and knowledge described above. The second part uses these accounts in order to evaluate different arguments which have been offered for and against foundationalism and coherentism. ;In part two a distinction is made between a priori and a posteriori objections against foundationalism or coherentism. The thesis is defended that in principle, both theories are successful in describing sufficient conditions for justification and knowledge. The question then remains as to which theory more satisfactorily accounts for the justified beliefs of beings like us. The thesis is defended that foundationalism best explains the justification we have for our beliefs. It is argued that coherentist theories fail to account for the role which experience plays in justification. ;Finally, it is asked whether coherentism might be successful in accounting for evaluative knowledge, where the role of experience seems less prominent. However, it is concluded that even evaluative knowledge rests on foundations