Abstract
Laura Odwazny and Benjamin Berkman have raised several challenges regarding the
new reasonable person standard in the revised Common Rule, which states that in‐
formed consent requires potential research subjects be provided with information a
reasonable person would want to know to make an informed decision on whether to
participate in a study. Our aim is to offer a response to the challenges Odwazny and
Berkman raise, which include the need for a reasonable person standard that can be
applied consistently across institutional review boards and that does not stigmatize
marginal groups. In response, we argue that the standard ought to be based in an
ordinary rather than ideal person conception of reasonable person and that the
standard ought to employ what we call a liberal constraint: the reasonability standard
must be malleable enough such that a wide variety of individuals with different,
unique value systems would endorse it. We conclude by suggesting some of the likely
consequences our view would have, if adopted.