Scepticism, demonstration and the infinite regress argument (nicholas of autrecourt and John buridan)

Vivarium 45 (s 2-3):328-342 (2007)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval posterity of the Aristotelian and Pyrrhonian treatments of the infinite regress argument. We show that there are some possible Pyrrhonian elements in Autrecourt's epistemology when he argues that the truth of our principles is merely hypothetical. By contrast, Buridan's criticisms of Autrecourt rely heavily on Aristotelian material. Both exemplify a use of scepticism.

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Induction and Natural Necessity in the Middle Ages.Stathis Psillos - 2015 - Philosophical Inquiry 39 (1):92-134.
Saadia Gaon.Jonathan Jacobs - 2011 - In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. pp. 1171--1173.

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