Reason and feeling: Resisting the dichotomy

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):385 – 399 (1993)
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Abstract

It is argued that it is not enough for feminist standpoint theory to argue that a feminine standpoint is better than a masculine one because of its genesis in female psycho-sexuality, it needs to show that its content is actually objectively more accurate. It then argues that historical feminists, such as Mary Wollstonecraft, have in fact tended to adopt a justice perspective, grounded in reason, which is objectively of greater value than that developed by many male authors, because these historical writers have failed to think that justice is incompatible with feeling and emotion and have attempted to combine the importance of sympathy, empathy, and feeling with the need for equality, liberty, and fairness.

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Karen Green
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.
A Question for Feminist Epistemology.Kate M. Phelan - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (6):514-529.
A question for feminist epistemology.Kate M. Phelan - 2017 - Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge 31 (6):514-529.
Rousseau's women.Karen Green - 1996 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1):87 – 109.

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