Authors
Toby Ord
Oxford University
Hilary Greaves
Oxford University
Abstract
Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that, as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one toward choosing the option preferred by the Total View and critical-level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v12i2.223
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References found in this work BETA

Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Moral Ignorance and Blameworthiness.Elinor Mason - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3037-3057.
Normative Uncertainty.William MacAskill - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox.Larry S. Temkin - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2):138-187.

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