Moral Uncertainty About Population Axiology

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):135-167 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that, as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one toward choosing the option preferred by the Total View and critical-level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,336

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral uncertainty about population ethics.Hilary Greaves & Toby Ord - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Population Axiology.Gustaf Svante Henning Arrhenius - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Population axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.
Moral uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.
Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison.Amelia Hicks - 2018 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 13. Oxford, UK: pp. 161-183.
Meta-Reasoning in Making Moral Decisions Under Normative Uncertainty.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2016 - In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action. College Publications. pp. 1093-1104.
Against Moral Hedging.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy (3):1-21.
Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists.Christian Tarsney - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):505-520.
Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):283.
An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):247-266.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-03

Downloads
68 (#205,092)

6 months
6 (#160,349)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Toby Ord
University of Oxford
Hilary Greaves
Oxford University

References found in this work

Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Moral ignorance and blameworthiness.Elinor Mason - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3037-3057.
Normative Uncertainty.William MacAskill - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
Intransitivity and the mere addition paradox.Larry S. Temkin - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2):138-187.

View all 23 references / Add more references