Abstract

The natural epistemology of W. V. Quine has not been well understood. Critics argue that Quine's scientific approach to epistemology is circular and fails to be normative, yet these criticisms tend to be based on the very presuppositions concerning language, theory, and epistemology that Quine is at pains to reject or alter. ;Quine's views on the meaningfulness of language use imply a breakdown in the dichotomy between language as a theoretically neutral instrument and theory as the commitment to some subset of the sentences allowed by a language. This breakdown, and the view of language which drives it, result in Quine's doctrine that speaking a language involves substantial theoretical commitments, and that inquiry must begin from within some ongoing theory of the world. That is, our epistemic practices, including epistemology itself, must be globally circular. The traditionally fundamental norm of linear propositional support, which drives the circularity objection, is thus seen as based in a misconception of language and theory. This not only explains Quine's lack of concern with the circularity of his view, but also illuminates the fundamental motivation for his general naturalism. ;Natural epistemology cannot be normative in the traditional sense of providing an independent ground for science. However, having accepted the "terminal parameter" of prediction as the test of theory, normativity becomes a matter of describing which procedures best promote predictively successful theory. Thus, epistemic norms emerge from science as hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of various methods in promoting predictively successful theory. Not only can natural epistemology prescribe and proscribe various epistemic practices, it offers the promise of an explanatory understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of those practices. Based on this understanding, natural epistemology further involves the improvement of current practices and the development of new ones. Crucial to this reconception of epistemology is the reconception of the knower as an adaptive organism employing the language/theory complex as an adaptive tool for interacting with the environment. ;The naturalism/anti-naturalism debate is advanced by acknowledging the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view, and by examining Quine's reconception of language, theory, and the human knowing subject