Authors
Alexander Greenberg
University of Southampton
Abstract
We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh's more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12158
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,410
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Truth Norm of Belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.
Fitting Belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.
Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.
Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith's Account of Sympathy.John W. McHugh - 2011 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):189-204.
Values and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 80-95.
What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
Control of Belief and Intention.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):337-346.
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 120-133.
The Limits of Sentimentalism.François Schroeter - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):337-361.
What Assertion Doesn't Show.Conor McHugh - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms.Christine Tappolet - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 113--127.
Fictional Emotion, Belief and Imagination.Bijoy Hati Boruah - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Guelph (Canada)
Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-06-21

Total views
71 ( #163,790 of 2,519,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,314 of 2,519,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes