Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):31-43 (1993)
AbstractPopular and scientific accounts of the U.S. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility. However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in connection with genetic research. Whether it does depends on the extent to which the genetic basis for behavior turns on behavioral incapacities.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Similar books and articles
The Human Genome Project and the Social Contract: A Law Policy Approach.Christian Byk - 1992 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (4):371-380.
How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem.Ted Honderich - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press. pp. 249.
Subversive Reflections on the Human Genome Project.Alex Rosenberg - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:329 - 335.
The Illusion of Freedom Evolves.Tamler Sommers - 2007 - In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual volition and social context. MIT Press. pp. 61.
The Human Genome Project: A Reply to Rosenberg. [REVIEW]Robin O. Andreasen & Milo J. Aukerman - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):673-678.
Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (March):3-27.