Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):51-61 (2018)
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_ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 51 - 61 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.

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10.1163/22105700-20171288

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Chapter 6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Closure-Based Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 144-166.
Chapter 4. Hinge Commitments.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 89-120.
Chapter 5. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 121-143.
Meaning and Conversational Impropriety in Sceptical Contexts.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):431-448.
Chapter 3. Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 61-88.
Chapter 1. Radical Skepticism and Closure.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 9-28.
Chapter 2. Radical Skepticism and Underdetermination.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 29-60.
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Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem.José Zalabardo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):615-627.
Notes.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 189-216.
Bibliography.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 217-236.
Index.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press. pp. 237-239.
Acknowledgments.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press.
Frontmatter.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press.

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John Greco
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Citations of this work

Closure, Underdetermination, and the Peculiarity of Sceptical Scenarios.Guido Tana - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):73-97.
Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions.Jonathan Nebel - 2019 - Synthese (6):1-13.

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