Chateaubriand's view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks

Manuscrito 27 (1):79-85 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-12

Downloads
15 (#884,991)

6 months
4 (#657,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dirk Greimann
Universidade Federal Fluminense

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references