Patrick Greenough
University of St. Andrews
In Replacing Truth, Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced, but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it before. I dub such a view Conceptual Marxism. In assessing this view, my goals are fourfold: to summarise the many components of Scharp’s theory of truth; to highlight what I take to be some of the excess baggage carried by the view; to assess whether, and to what extent, the extreme methodology on offer is at all called for; finally, to briefly propose a less radical replacement strategy for resolving the liar paradox.
Keywords Conceptual Engineering  Truth  Liar Paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2017.1287919
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1964 - Routledge.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth.Mark Pinder - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):151-161.
From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
Replies to Bacon, Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):422-475.
Alethic Vengeance.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Truth, the Liar, and Relativism.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):427-510.
Replacing Truth, by Kevin Scharp.Graham Priest - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):553-558.
Kevin Scharp, Replacing Truth.John P. Burgess - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (5):1087-1089.
Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. [REVIEW]Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):541-543.
Truth's Saviour?Kevin Scharp - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):183-188.
REVIEWS-Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.G. Priest & Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (4).


Added to PP index

Total views
497 ( #18,476 of 2,518,749 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #48,240 of 2,518,749 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes