Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge

Teoria: Rivista di Filosofia Fondata da Vittorio Sainati 38 (2):123-33 (2018)
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Abstract

In this essay, I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguish​ it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or vicious characters.

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Lorenzo Greco
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila

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