Decision making with unreliable probabilities

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Abstract

This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory

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10.1111/j.2044-8317.1983.tb01130.x

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Peter Gärdenfors
Lund University

Citations of this work

The Irrelevance of the Risk-Uncertainty Distinction.Dominic Roser - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (5):1387-1407.
Second-order probabilities and belief functions.Jonathan Baron - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (1):25-36.

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