Abstract

Beginning with an examination of the history of marriage and a concentration on the legal changes that the institution of marriage has undergone in the United States, this dissertation explores the permissibility of same-sex marriage. The investigation of current arguments both for and against same-sex marriage provides evidence of a problematic that hinders the debate. This dissertation focuses on the naturalistic assumptions that arguments made from the stances of ethical essentialism, natural law tradition, and ethical naturalism rest upon and the inadequacy of such arguments since they allow for disparate conclusions to the same question. By utilizing the concept of justice as fairness as articulated by John Rawls, an alternative solution to the question of legalizing same sex marriage is presented. In light of the position of the citizens' representatives behind the veil of ignorance, it is determined that sexual orientation would not be known or considered during the formulation of the structure of society. Because justice as fairness considers the family to be one of the basic structures of society, all citizens should be treated in an equal and just matter as dictated by the principles of justice, including their ability to participate within those structures. With the absence of naturalistic assumptions and the application of Rawl's political theory of justice, it is the conclusion of this dissertation that same-sex couples should qualify for inclusion in the institution of marriage