Thermal Perception and its Relation to Touch

Philosophers' Imprint 23 (25) (2023)
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Abstract

Touch is standardly taken to be a proximal sense, principally constituted by capacities to detect proximal pressure and thermal stimulation, and contrasted with the distal senses of vision and audition. It has, however, recently been argued that the scope of touch extends beyond proximal perception; touch can connect us to distal objects. Hence touch generally should be thought of as a connection sense. In this paper, I argue that whereas pressure perception is a connection sense, thermal perception is not. Thermal perception is a proximal sense distinct from touch. One significant consequence of this is that it motivates an alternative explanation of how we detect the thermal properties of the things we touch and what they are.

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Richard Gray
Cardiff University

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References found in this work

Sight and touch.Michael Martin - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States.Kathleen Akins - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337-372.
The sense of touch.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):37 – 58.

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