In The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History. Volume IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London: pp. 111-138 (2018)
AbstractSocial knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.
Similar books and articles
On the Possibility of Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):513-526.
Counterexamples to Testimonial Transmission.Peter Graham & Zachary Bachman - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 61-77.
Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.
Testimonial knowledge and transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.
Collaborative Scientific Knowledge and Testimonial Justification.Angella Yamamoto - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo
Epistemic authority, testimony and the transmission of knowledge†.Arnon Keren - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):368-381.
Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge.Arnon Keren - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):368-381.
Elizabeth Fricker on Testimonial Justification: A Critical Review.Alireza Dorri Nogoorani & Reza Akbari - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (26):147-168.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.