Review of Gabor Forrai, Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism [Book Review]

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (2) (2002)
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Abstract

Gabor Forrai has written a very clear and articulate defense of internal realism, the view that the categories and structures of the world are a function of our conceptual schemes. Internal realism is opposed to metaphysical realism, the view that the world’s structure is wholly independent, both causally and ontologically, of the human mind. For the metaphysical realist, the world is one thing and the mind is another. For the internal realist, on the other hand, though the world is causally independent of the human mind, the structure of the world – the individuals, kinds and categories of the world -- is a function of the human mind.

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Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside

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