Noûs 54 (1):78-104 (2020)

Authors
Aidan Gray
University of Illinois, Chicago
Abstract
Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.
Keywords Frege's Puzzle  Relationism  Cognitive Significance  Reference  Mental Files
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12251
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mental Filing.Rachel Goodman & Aidan Gray - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):204-226.
Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.

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