Getting what you want

Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1791-1810 (2020)
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The compelling, widely-accepted Satisfaction-is-Truth Principle says that if S wants p, then S has a desire that's satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. We reject the Principle; an agent may want p without having a desire that's satisfied when p obtains in any old way. Other theorists who reject the Principle rely on contested intuitions about when agents get what they want. We instead appeal to—and shed new light on—the dispositional role of desire.

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Author Profiles

Milo Phillips-Brown
University of Edinburgh
Lyndal Grant
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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