Abstract

Commentators have tried to explain Aristotle's defense of the theoretical life as a product of intellectual prejudice. Such an explanation is unphilosophical. The reason for Aristotle's promotion of theoria and of nous is the same reason for his promotion of states. In chapter five I argue that Aristotle's philosophy of action has an Eleatic foundation and purpose. The properties which Aristotle attributes to energeia in NE X.4 are Parmenides' properties of being. In fact, the energeia-kinesis distinction is prefigured by Xenophanes. I show how, given the desiderata of Aristotelian realism, the energeia-kinesis distinction is an adaptation of the Eleatic distinction between being and becoming. States provide closure for the world of becoming. ;I provide an application for my interpretation of the energeia-kinesis distinction in chapter four. Although Aristotle's identification of the good life with "activity of soul" seems to support the view that energeia is activity, I show that Aristotle's argument does not presuppose activity in the Kenny-Vendler sense. On the other hand, Aristotle's discussion of the criteria satisfied by theoria in NE X presupposes that the good life is a state. The assumption that psykhes energeia is a state allows us to see how Book X is not a mere appendage but follows inevitably from Book I. ;Aristotle identifies energeia with kinesis in etymological remarks. I argue in chapter three that kinesis does not mean "activity" in the Kenny-Vendler sense. Rather the etymology of energeia and Aristotle's earliest usages show that energeiai are or include states. The development of the concept of energeia in Aristotle's thought shows an increasing stress on the notion of state. ;In chapter two I show that the energeia-kinesis distinction as I have interpreted it can be deduced from Aristotle's general doctrines of actuality and change, independent of Aristotle's remarks in Met. 6.1048b18ff. Change is defined in terms of actuality and exhibits three phases of development. Changes correspond to performances. Aristotle also recognizes a two-phase development, which I argue consists of states. On the basis of characteristics Aristotle assigns to the two kinds of development, I show that the key theses of the energeia-kinesis distinction can be deduced. ;In Metaphysics 6 Aristotle divides actions into energeiai and kineseis on the basis of a linguistic test employing the perfect tense. Although Aristotle's distinction and his test have been influential in the development of contemporary action theory, critics find that his principle of classification conflicts with his classification of some examples. They accordingly charge him with failing to arrive at a coherent theory. In chapter one I argue that the criticism of Aristotle is based on a double error. Commentators include what A. Kenny and Z. Vendler have called activities in the class of energeiai. But in fact all of Aristotle's examples of energeiai correspond to Kenny-Vendler states. The assumption which underlies the criticism, namely that Aristole's test for energeiai is identical to Kenny's test for activities, depends upon an illicit use of the Greek perfect. Properly understood, Aristotle's examples are accomodated. I reply to objections and sketch a philosophical motivation for Aristotle's theory given my interpretation