Does integrity require moral goodness?

Ratio 14 (3):234–251 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Most accounts of integrity agree that the person of integrity must have a relatively stable sense of who he is, what is important to him, and the ability to stand by what is most important to him in the face of pressure to do otherwise. But does integrity place any constraints on the kind of principles that the person of integrity stands for? In response to several recent accounts of integrity, I argue that it is not enough that a person stand for what he believes in, nor even that he is committed to and stands for what, in his best judgement, is morally right. In our web of moral concepts integrity is internally related to a host of virtues which exclude weakness of will and dogmatism, and presuppose trustworthiness. Integrity requires that the principles stood for must be those that a morally good, morally trustworthy agent would stand for, and that the agent himself is morally trustworthy.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
73 (#205,340)

6 months
9 (#144,939)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jody Graham
Auburn University

Citations of this work

A theory of religious accommodation.Paul Bou-Habib - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):109–126.
Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?Greg Scherkoske - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.
The ethics of arguing.Hugh Breakey - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):589-613.
Integrity.Damian Cox - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references