A Two-Factor Theory of Immediate Justification
Abstract
In this paper I outline and defend a theory of immediate or foundational justification that I call "phenomenal reliabilism". This theory incorporates elements from Huemer’s theory of phenomenal conservatism and Comesaña’s indexical reliabilism. The basic idea of the theory I propose is that certain mental states contribute in a twofold way to the epistemic justification of beliefs, namely due to the way they determine how things seem to a subject and due to the fact that they are actually reliable indicators of the truth of their contents. The first component allows this theory to accommodate internalist intuitions. The second component allows it to foster the connection between justification and truth without being subject to the counterexamples that plague simple or unqualified reliabilist theories. I also try to show that this theory is superior to rival theories that have been proposed in the literature, like Huemer’s theory itself (2001) or a process-reliabilist treatment of foundational justification as in Goldman (2008a).