Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):337-339 (2010)
AbstractAre delusions best understood as a species of belief? Can I be deluded that p without believing that p? Because delusion is a clinical symptom, there are conflicting data at every turn. Perhaps it is best to think of delusions as beliefs not because they necessarily are beliefs, but because doing so helps patients. If one thinks that “denying that delusions are beliefs” means denying deluded patients “a voice in their own treatment” and that this would cut them off from alternative and healthier ways of thinking of themselves or the world, then one may wish to classify delusions as beliefs (see Kinderman and Bentall 2007, 288). I do not wish to classify delusions as beliefs (and I doubt ..
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The nature of delusion: An analysis of the contemporary philosophical debates.Paredes Aline Aurora Maya - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Central Lancashire
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