Theory of mind and the ontology of belief

Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August):145-156 (1997)
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the problem of animals' beliefs and the ontology associated with the idea of having non propositional content. It is argue that the beliefs of mute animals mainly serve an explanatory purpose

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Simone Gozzano
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila

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