Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (1):25-52 (2008)

This paper provides a computational framework, based on defeasible logic, to capture some aspects of institutional agency. Our background is Kanger-Lindahl-Pörn account of organised interaction, which describes this interaction within a multi-modal logical setting. This work focuses in particular on the notions of counts-as link and on those of attempt and of personal and direct action to realise states of affairs. We show how standard defeasible logic (DL) can be extended to represent these concepts: the resulting system preserves some basic properties commonly attributed to them. In addition, the framework enjoys nice computational properties, as it turns out that the extension of any theory can be computed in time linear to the size of the theory itself.
Keywords Institutional agency  Agent societies  Counts-as  Defeasible logic
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DOI 10.1007/s10506-007-9056-y
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
Agency and Deontic Logic.John F. Horty - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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Before and After Dung: Argumentation in AI and Law.T. J. M. Bench-Capon - 2020 - Argument and Computation 11 (1-2):221-238.

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