Abstract
For maximin egalitarians, the intergene rational context raises a threefold challenge. First, doesn't intergenerational maximin simply require a prohibition on dissavings, as a commutative conception of justice based on indirect reciprocity does ? Second, shouldn't we take seriously the aggregative worries of utilitarians in order not to remain eternally stuck into misery. Thus, shouldn't we abandon maximin ? Third, don't we find ourselves in a context where standard egalitarianism and maximin egalitarianism would coincide ? The A. provides a negative answer to each of these three questions. He indicates in particular the extent to which maximin egalitarianism does not simply amount to a non-dis-savings rule. He stresses the way in which we should think about intergenerational justice in a properly distributive manner and he examines the way in which we can deal with the « aggregative challenge ».