The Place of Punishment in Kant's Rechtslehre

Kantian Review 4:121-130 (2000)
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Abstract

If Kant had never written the section of the Rechtslehre on punishment we would still have known from the Critique of Practical Reason that he held a strongly retributive view of punishment. But it is not a view which we could have inferred from the rest of the Rechtslehre. Despite its intuitive appeal, Kant's justification of judicial punishment simply does not fit the account of right he gives in the Rechtslehre. According to this account the only justification for coercion is that it constitutes a ‘hindering of a hindrance’ to freedom. But there is no way in which this requires punishment to be retributive

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Citations of this work

Kant on capital punishment and suicide.Attila Ataner - 2006 - Kant Studien 97 (4):452-482.
Kant-Bibliographie 2000.Margit Ruffing - 2002 - Kant Studien 93 (4):491-536.

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