Abstract

Hume began his Treatise with the bold intention to turn philosophy into a ‘science of man’. In the conclusion to Book One, however, Hume’s confidence is replaced with intense despair over the unreliability of this human science. Rather quickly, however, Hume rejects this despair, accepting that such scepticism is unwarranted and can be cured by reference to our natural associative tendencies. Many have suggested that Hume emerged from this crisis because he changed his feelings about the matter, with little justification. In this thesis, by contrast, I argue that Hume’s jump from pessimism to optimism relies upon his arguments about the ‘empire of imagination’ in the creation of our ideas and beliefs about the experienced world. The key, as I will show, is how one interprets the creative imagination, which Hume refers to as the fancy. My central hypothesis is that there are two distinct roles played by the fancy: the critical and the fictitious. The critical fancy mixes with natural causation to create ideas that represent the world as we experience it. The fictitious fancy creates ideas that do not represent the world as we experience it. In essence, my argument is that the dialectic between the two types of fancy allowed Hume to emerge from his sceptical crisis because our fundamental beliefs about the world have a basis in a particular natural function of the imagination that renders their formation possible. More specifically, the critical fancy serves to justify our beliefs about the world as we experience it.