The myth of full belief

Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):164-171 (2023)
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Abstract

Belief is typically understood to be the success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge. But there is no success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge.

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10.1111/phpe.12185

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Jeremy Goodman
Johns Hopkins University

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References found in this work

Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.
Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.
Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.
Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology.Sven Rosenkranz - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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