Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts

Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):21-46 (2010)


Th ere is much controversy surrounding the nature of the relation between fictional individuals and possible individuals. Some have argued that no fictional individual is a possible individual; others have argued that (some) fictional individuals just are (merely) possible individuals. In this paper, I off er further grounds for believing the theory of fictional individuals defended by Amie Thomasson,viz., Artifactualism, by arguing that her view best allows one to make sense of this puzzling relation. More specifically, when we realize that the view allows for an identification of merely possible individuals with fictional individuals, we seethat the utility, and hence the level of credence lent to Artifactualism, is increased. After arguing for this thesis, I respond to three of the most pressing worries.

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Jeffrey Goodman
James Madison University

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Citations of this work

Nonexistent Objects.Maria Reicher - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Semantics of Fiction.Manuel García-Carpintero - forthcoming - Mind and Language.

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