Action in a narrow and in a broad sense

In Ana Marta Gonzalez & Alejandro G. Vigo (eds.), Practical rationality. Scope and structures of human agency. Georg Olms. pp. 123-168 (2010)
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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the difference between deliberate action and spontaneous action, and see how Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Kant approach this topic.

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Ana Marta Gonzalez
Universidad de Navarra

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