Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta

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Abstract

We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.

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Author Profiles

Craig French
Nottingham University
Anil Gomes
Oxford University

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References found in this work

The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.Matthew Soteriou - 2013 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Consciousness and Reference.John Campbell - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

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