Parainconsistency of credibility-based belief states

Logic and Logical Philosophy 9:183 (2001)
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Abstract

In our approach credibility of information plays an importantrole in modeling of both belief state and belief change [4]. It turns out thatthe credibility-based consequence operators used to define the notion of beliefstate tolerate inconsistency under some conditions

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References found in this work

A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Semantic Considerations on nonmonotonic Logic.Robert C. Moore - 1985 - Artificial Intelligence 25 (1):75-94.
Theory contraction through base contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.
Introduction: Paraconsistent logics.Graham Priest & Richard Routley - 1984 - Studia Logica 43 (1-2):3 - 16.

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