Knowing without knowing : implicit cognition and the minds of infants and animals

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to highlight the need to address the conceptual problem of “implicit knowledge” or “implicit cognition” —a notion especially important in the study of the nonverbal minds of animals and infants. We review some uses of the term ‘implicit’ in psychology and allied disciplines,and conclude that conceptual clarification of this notion is not only lacking, but largely avoided and reduced to a methodological problem. We propose that this elusive notion is central in the study not only of animal and infant minds, but also the human adult mind. Some promising approaches in developmental and evolutionary psychology towards innovative conceptualisation of implicit knowledge remain conceptually underdeveloped and in need of reconsideration and re-elaboration. We conclude by suggesting that the challenge of implicit cognition and nonverbal minds will only be solved through a concerted interdisciplinary approach between psychology and other disciplines.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

On Knowing One's Own Language.Barry C. Smith - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 391--428.
Phenomenology and the Problem of Animal Minds.Simon P. James - 2009 - Environmental Values 18 (1):33 - 49.
Implicit attitudes and implicit prejudices.René Baston & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):889-903.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-08

Downloads
30 (#504,503)

6 months
3 (#902,269)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Derek Ball
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Why Philosophers should do Semantics : a Reply to Cappelen.Ryan M. Nefdt - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):243-256.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references