Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19 (2014)

Authors
Anil Gomes
Oxford University
Abstract
According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
Keywords kant  perception  non-conceptual  transcendental deduction
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqt019
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.
The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1):93-119.

View all 34 citations / Add more citations

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