We Made Progress: Collective Epistemic Progress in Dialogue without Consensus

Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (3):423-440 (2013)
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Abstract

Class discussions about ethical, social, philosophical and other controversial issues frequently result in disagreement. This leaves a problem: has there been any progress? This article introduces and analyses the concept ‘collective epistemic progress’ in order to resolve this problem. The analysis results in four main ways of understanding, guiding and judging collective epistemic progress in the face of seemingly irreconcilable differences. Although it might seem plausible to analyse and judge collective epistemic progress by the increasing vigour of the dialogue community, by how long the conversation is continued, or by how close we have moved towards consensus or the truth, I argue that these fail to provide serviceable analyses or epistemic criteria. Yet, we might instead analyse, understand and judge progress using epistemic criteria such as whether we have: furthered the one distributed process of inquiry or deliberation; and reached mutual understanding; inquiry milestones; or consensus about our procedures.

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Clinton Golding
University of Otago

Citations of this work

The Community of Inquiry: Blending Philosophical and Empirical Research.Clinton Golding - 2014 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 34 (2):205-216.
A Handy Account of Philosophy in Schools.Clinton Golding - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy in Schools 1 (1):68-88.

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References found in this work

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Truth and method.Hans-Georg Gadamer - 1975 - New York: Continuum. Edited by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall.
EPZ Truth and Method.Hans Georg Gadamer, Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall - 2004 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Edited by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall.
Thought and Language.A. L. Wilkes, L. S. Vygotsky, E. Hanfmann & G. Vakar - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (55):178.

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