The Right Argument from Moral Disagreement

Theoria 88 (4):850-867 (2022)
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Abstract

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 850-867, August 2022.

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10.1111/theo.12401

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Alan H. Goldman
College of William and Mary

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References found in this work

A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):419-425.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.

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