The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

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Erkenntnis 85 (4):829-840 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.

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10.1007/s10670-018-0052-2

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Author Profiles

Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Reliabilism Defended.Jeffrey Tolly - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):619-635.

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References found in this work

Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.

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