Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276 (1989)
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Abstract

That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M Hare, Gilbert Harman, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the many philosophers addressed.

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Irwin Goldstein
Davidson College

Citations of this work

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The problem of defective desires.Chris Heathwood - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.
Pains as reasons.Manolo Martínez - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274.
The badness of pain.Gwen Bradford - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (2):236-252.
Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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