McTaggart on time

Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:71-76 (2004)
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Contemporary discussions on the nature of time begin with McTaggart, who introduces the distinction between what he takes to be the only two possible realist theories of time: the A-theory, maintaining that past, present, and future are absolute; and the B-theory, maintaining that they are relative. McTaggart argues against both theories to conclude that time is not real. In this paper, I reconstruct his argument against the A-theory. Then, I show that this argument is flawed. Finally, I draw a lesson for those engaged in contemporary discussions on the nature of time



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Nathaniel Goldberg
Washington and Lee University

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