Nathaniel Goldberg
Washington and Lee University
Contemporary discussions on the nature of time begin with McTaggart, who introduces the distinction between what he takes to be the only two possible realist theories of time: the A-theory, maintaining that past, present, and future are absolute; and the B-theory, maintaining that they are relative. McTaggart argues against both theories to conclude that time is not real. In this paper, I reconstruct his argument against the A-theory. Then, I show that this argument is flawed. Finally, I draw a lesson for those engaged in contemporary discussions on the nature of time
Keywords time  McTaggart
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DOI 10.12775/LLP.2004.004
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