Freedom and the principles of morality

Filozofija I Društvo 2003 (21):97-106 (2003)
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Abstract

Freedom as an authentic and willed process, characteristic of man as a human rational being, enables the individual to act in accordance with the principles of morality, since the individual can choose between good and evil, and in this way to get out of the sphere of the given to which the rest of the living world is limited. We should recall the forgotten Marx and his famous text on the essential difference between the animal world and humanity as a genus: "The animal is immediately united with its vital activity. It does not differ from it. It is vital activity. Man makes his own vital activity the subject of his will and consciousness. He has conscious vital activity. This is not a determination with which he merges immediately. Conscious vital activity distinguishes man directly from animal vital activity. It is exactly in this way alone that he is a generic being. Or a conscious being, i.e. his own life is a subject for him precisely because he is a generic being. It is only for this reason that his activity is free activity...". In other words, while animals live just the life of their species and cannot choose anything else, since the choice has been made by the fact of their belonging to a species, man can choose the world in which to live, overcoming in this way the natural givens. Here lies the core of the anthropological explanation of the principle of morality, inconceivable without man's ability to be an authentic free being. Sloboda kao autenticni voljni proces, svojstven coveku kao ljudskom umnom bicu, omogucuje individui da postupa u skladu sa nacelima moralnosti, buduci da individua moze da bira izmedju dobra i zla i da na taj nacin izadje iz sfere datosti na koju je ogranicen ostali zivi svet. Podsetimo se zaboravljenog Marxa i cuvenog teksta o sustinskoj razlici izmedju sveta zivotinjskih vrsta i coveka kao roda:?zivotinja je neposredno jedinstvena sa svojom zivotnom delatnoscu. Ona se od nje ne razlikuje. Ona je zivotna datost. Covek cini samu svoju zivotnu delatnost predmetom svoga htenja i svoje svesti. On ima svesnu zivotnu delatnost. To nije odredjenost s kojom se on neposredno stapa. Svesna zivotna delatnost razlikuje coveka neposredno od zivotinjske zivotne delatnosti. On je upravo samo na taj nacin genericko bice. Ilije samo svesno bice, tj. njegov vlastiti zivot mu je predmet upravo zato sto je genericko bice. Samo zato je njegova delatnost slobodna delatnost...". Drugim recima, dok zivotinjski svet zivi samo zivotom svoje vrste i ne moze da izabere nista drugo, on je srastao sa vrstom kojoj pripada, covek moze da bira svet u kojem ce ziveti prevazilazeci na taj nacin prirodnu datost. Ovde je sadrzana bit antropoloskog objasnjenja principa moralnosti, koji se bez sposobnosti coveka da bude autenticno slobodno bice ne bi mogao pojmiti..

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