Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):253-277 (2004)

Authors
Natalie Gold
London School of Economics
Abstract
A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if and only if two conditions are met. First, different presentations of the decision problem lead the agent to consider the propositions in a different order (the empirical condition). Second, different such “decision paths” lead to different decisions on the target proposition (the logical condition). The second condition holds when the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are “implicitly inconsistent,” which may be caused by violations of “deductive closure.” Our account is consistent with some observations made by psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance.
Keywords Framing  Kahneman and Tversky  Decision making  Rationality  Path-dependent reasoning
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267104000203
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References found in this work BETA

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & A. B. C. Research Group - 1999 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA.
Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice.Amos Tversky - 1972 - Psychological Review 79 (4):281-299.
Reason-Based Choice.E. Shafir - 1993 - Cognition 49 (1-2):11-36.

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Citations of this work BETA

Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
Theories of Team Agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press.
Where Do Preferences Come From?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.

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