Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137 (2007)

Authors
Robert Sugden
University of East Anglia
Natalie Gold
London School of Economics
Abstract
In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of the intentions themselves, but of the mode of reasoning by which they are formed. We analyse collective intentions as the outcome of team reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning used by individuals as members of groups. We describe this mode of reasoning in terms of formal schemata, discuss a range of possible accounts of group agency, and show how existing theories of collective intentions fit into this framework.
Keywords collective intention  group identification  team agency  team reasoning
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2007104328
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.

View all 75 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Logic of Team Reasoning.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.
Theories of Team Agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press.
Collective and Joint Intention.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):143–166.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
Social Intentions: Aggregate, Collective, and General.J. K. Swindler - 1996 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (1):61-76.
Acting Together.Christopher Kutz - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):1-31.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
629 ( #12,822 of 2,507,584 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #18,893 of 2,507,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes