Individuality and Human Beginnings: A Reply to David DeGrazia

Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 35 (3):457-462 (2007)
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Abstract

The author argues that individuality does not require indivisibility and that twinning can be explained as the reprogramming of blastomeres that already have begun to differentiate in accordance with the needs of the unified organism that originates at conception

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Citations of this work

Sixteen days.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2003 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):45 – 78.
Futures of Value and the Destruction of Human Embryos.Rob Lovering - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 463-88.

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Sameness and substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 174 (1):125-128.

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