Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to Valente

Manuscrito 43 (4):130-141 (2020)
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Abstract

Matheus Valente presents a number of examples designed to show that my theory of reference fixing for demonstratives violates the desideratum that demonstrative thoughts should be transparent to speakers. In this note I argue that the alleged desideratum is not really such and defend my theory against other criticisms made by Valente.

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10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mv

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Mario Gomez-Torrente
National Autonomous University of Mexico

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Dthat.David Kaplan - 1978 - In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 221--243.
Explanation and reference.Hilary Putnam - 1973 - In Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214.
How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.

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